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India's position in world
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INDIA'S POSITION IN WORLD POLITICS

BY

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"IS JAPAN A MENACE TO ASIA?" "ISOLATION OF JAPAN
IN WORLD POLITICS" "ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE
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
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
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To
THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE
WITH JUSTICE AND LIBERTY TO ALL PEOPLES.

“A statesman is the child of circumstances, a creature of his time ; a statesman is essentially, a practical character, and when called to the helm of the affairs, he has not to enquire what may, in the past, have been his views on this or that subject. He has only to ascertain what is necessary and to discover the most satisfactory and complete method in which affairs can be conducted. I laugh at the objection brought against anyone that at some earlier period in his career he urged a policy different from that which he advocates at the present. All I ask is that his present policy be calculated to achieve its end, and that he at the present moment be determined to serve his country in her present circumstances.”—*Disraeli*.



PUBLISHERS' NOTE.

Sj. Tarak Nath Das is an Indian, an American citizen, an M.A. in political science, and a fellow in the same subject from the University of Washington. He has lived in and intimately studied political and economic forces in Asian countries, particularly in China, Japan and India. For the same purpose he travelled and studied in various European countries. But his chief study was of and in Asia.

For a number of years, Sj. Das has been a speaker and writer on Asian politics and is recognized as the foremost representative of his race in America. He is a powerful speaker, being a master of incontrovertible facts which he presents in a scholarly and scientific manner. He is the author of some books on Asian politics as well as of many magazine and newspaper articles.

Sj. Das's lecture topics are :—

1. The Awakenink of Asia, or Asia in World Politics.
2. India's Position in International Politics.

3. The Swaraj (Nationalist) Movement of India.
4. American Trade Opportunities in India.
5. The Labour Movement in Asia.
6. Japan in World Politics.
7. China in World Politics.
8. Philosophy and Literature of Ancient and Modern India.
9. Buddhism.
10. Confucianism.
11. America's Responsibility of World Peace.
12. Mahatma Gandhi and World Peace.

We have every hope that this book of his will be of interest to the politically minded Indians, of every shade of opinion.

PUBLISHERS.

PREFACE

At the suggestion of one of India's most far-sighted and sincere friends in the United States, Mr. Grenville S. MacFarland, Editor-in-Chief of the *Boston American*, and Chairman of the American Commission to Promote Swaraj in India, I began to collect data showing how India had influenced the course of British world politics.

This book is my humble contribution to the cause of Indian Swaraj. I am fully aware of the incompleteness of the study, but I hope that it may inspire others who have more time for research and are more fortunately placed to continue investigation on this topic.

I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Hon. Robert M. LaFollette of the United States Senate for assisting me in obtaining permission to study in the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., and to the Librarian for the courtesy extended to me. I also wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to my American friends to have helped in the preparation of this study.

The proceeds from the sale of this book are to be used for the purpose of establishing friendly relations between India and the other nations, particularly with the great Republic of the United States of America.

The Library of Congress,
WASHINGTON, D.C. }
Dec. 27, 1921.

TARAKNATH DAS.

CONTENTS.

	Page.
Preface	ix
Introduction by an Asian Statesman ...	xiii
CHAPTER I.—	
India and the growth of the British Empire	1
CHAPTER II.—	
Anglo-French Rivalry in India, 1763-1815	13
CHAPTER III.—	
Anglo-Russian Relations on the Indian Frontier	21
CHAPTER IV.— ²	
The Approaches to India—The Suez Canal	29
CHAPTER V.—	
The Approaches to India—The Persian Gulf	35
CHAPTER VI.—	
The British Policy towards the Persian Gulf and the Berlin-Bagdad Railway	47
CHAPTER VII.—	
Anglo-Japanese Relations as influenced by India	59

CHAPTER VIII.—

Anglo-Chinese Relations as influenced by India	64
--	----

CHAPTER IX.—

India and British Militarism	69
-------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER X.—

Recent Aspects of Britain's Indian Policy	75
---	----

INTRODUCTION

BY

AN ASIAN STATESMAN.

India is as big as all of Europe except Russia and it has a population of over 315,000,000 people, one-fifth of the whole human race. India of the time of the Emperor Asoka was a more powerful empire than the Roman Empire or Greece of the day of Alexander the Great. India has contributed a good deal for the progress of civilization of the world. Yet the political scientists of the west often class India as a backward nation and the question of India is regarded as Britain's private affair, as if the people of India are Britain's slaves. But India is in revolt and there is no denying about it, even the British rulers are mighty anxious about India. At the present time the effort of British statesmen is directed to keep India within the British Empire by persuasion, by offering concessions and using unrelenting repression against those who believe

in separation and establishment of a Federated Republic of the United States of India. The writer of this booklet "India's Position in World Politics" is a republican Indian nationalist, whom I have the privilege of knowing for about fifteen years. Mr. Taraknath Das, has in this volume in a novel way tried to show that India is the centre of world politics and none can ignore importance of India in world politics. In short, he has tried to show that world peace depends upon freedom of Asia through Indian independence and thus Indian question should attract keenest interest of the statesmen of all countries. He urges his countrymen to make the question of Indian independence an international issue. There are many who may not agree with the author but the little volume has good food for thought for students of international Politics, particularly Indian and Asian statesmen.

TOKIO, JAPAN,
June 15, 1922.

INDIA'S POSITION IN WORLD POLITICS

CHAPTER I

INDIA AND THE GROWTH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

Cobden, addressing the British House of Commons on June 27, 1853, said: "The English race can never become indigenous to India; we must govern it, if we govern it at all, by means of a succession of transient visits; and I do not think for the interest of the English people anymore than of the people of India that we should govern them permanently—I see no benefit which can arise to the mass of the English people from connection with India, except that which may arise from honest trade."*

* Jones, Edgar R. *Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy, 1738—1914*, p. 508.

INDIA'S POSITION IN WORLD POLITICS

Each year the truth in the above statement is more clearly demonstrated to the people of India. Modern British statesmanship appears blind to it, however, and is working strenuously to stave off the day when India will free herself from the British imperialistic system. Indian statesmen, even the moderates of moderates, know that the time will come when India will assert her independence. In India to-day there is a school of statesmanship which does not consider sufficiently the importance of India's position in the realm of world politics. The leaders of this school minimize, if they do not ignore, the importance of establishing foreign relations with nations abroad while carrying on the struggle for independence at home. It is true that self-help will play the most important part in freeing India from the foreign yoke, but India cannot remain unmindful of the need of establishing direct foreign relations with other nations.

India's dominant geographical position, her resources, her commerce, her culture, must inevitably compel her to be a part of the world

movement. "European thought, European commerce, and European enterprise, although actually gaining in force, and European connections, although becoming more and more intimate, will nevertheless relatively sink in importance in the future, while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and adjacent territories will become the chief theatre of human events and activities in the world's great hereafter."* The years following the conclusions of the World War have made increasingly evident the wisdom of these words of America's great Secretary of State.

It has been through India that Asia has been involved in the intrigues of European diplomacy. British foreign policy during the last three centuries has been greatly influenced by its strong determination to control India, because control of India is necessary for the maintenance of British supremacy, in Europe and in Asia, and world politics generally.

There are yet those in India who depend

* William H. Seward.

upon British liberals and British Labour to do justice to the people of India.

This is a vain hope. Whatever of Democracy has been gained by the English people in respect to suffrage and personal rights, its influence does not extend to the Foreign Office nor govern Britain's foreign policy. British liberals and British labour do not dream of giving up any part of the Empire. In this respect there is no division of opinion between different groups in England. The spirit which animates British foreign policy is the preservation and expansion of the Empire. "Nothing changes in the character and view of our (British) foreign policy. We seek to be at peace everywhere and to make acquisitions without war, always keeping ourselves on the defensive; we place no faith in the friendships of those whose interests do not accord with our own, and we lose no opportunity of injuring them, without ostensibly violating treaties."*

England's interest is concentrated in sea power. General Homer Lea quotes the words

* Cargill, William, *Foreign Affairs of Great Britain Administered by Palmerston*, p. 27, ff.

of the Marquis of Salisbury to prove that the power of British imperialism is dependent on her control of the sea.* “There have been great colonial and maritime powers, four or five, but they have always fallen....If we ever allow our defences at sea to fall to such a point of inefficiency that it is as easy, or nearly as easy, to cross the sea as it is to cross a land frontier, our great empire, stretching to the ends of the earth, supported by maritime force in every part of it, will come clattering to the ground when a blow at the Metropolis of England is struck.”

Britain can never give up the control of India, so necessary to her system of naval communications, while her foreign policy continues as heretofore, because India has been the central motive of her imperial expansion. The salient points in the development of British sea power have been admirably summarized by Arthur Jose. Drawing an analogy between the Roman and British Empires he says,† “The Romans, planting themselves in military settlements over the lands they subdued, bound these outposts of

* Lea, Homer, *The Valor of Ignorance*, p. 119.

† Jose, Arthur, *The Growth of the Empire*, pp. 394-397.

their empire together with great high roads, and guarded the roads with forts at every crossing. From London to Lincoln the way is marked for us by Godmanchester and Caster and Lancaster. Just so to-day the British Empire is bound together with our ocean highways, and those ways are guarded from end to end not only by the settlements they thread, but by military stations and stations that, though they have now grown into industrial communities, were first and are primarily of military importance.

“As usual, we began with no definite plans, and it was the French who first taught us the strategic value of these intermediate seaports. But some of them we had obtained for other reasons. St. Helena had thus in 1651 become our half-way house on the Cape Route to India : and Gibraltar was seized in 1704 that we might keep free for our trade the gate of the Mediterranean. Presently the raids of Anson on Spain's South American colonies suggested the utility of procuring another half-way house on our warship's route to the Pacific ; and when the Seven Years' War was over we annexed and partially occupied the Falkland Islands. But now France,

sore with the loss of Canada and India, bethought her of the revenge offered by a privateering war—a *guerre de course* such as the French navy still dreams of—and by the way of preparation marked down the harbours from which our East Indian trade could be most easily attacked. We did not come so well out of the American War as to stop from proceeding with these plans; but, the great War—Revolutionary and Napoleonic—was decisive enough to give British Ministers whatever they chose to take. It had been long enough, too, to disclose fully the whole scheme by which our greatest enemy hoped to destroy our Empire. Napoleon harassed our Indian convoys from the Mauritius; but his hope had been to create for our destruction a French route to India, either by Egypt and the Red Sea, or, later, by some overland route to Persia and the Gulf. On the lines he thus made clear, it became our policy to establish a secure defence, wither mastering the new roads or at least blocking their entrances and exits. The policy has been carried out spasmodically, it is true; there have been intervals when it seemed forgotten, years when it was well nigh reversed: but that way

the current has tended, and its results are clear on the map today.

“For these are the great ocean-roads of trade:—Firstly, those that run east and west across the North Atlantic and North Pacific, free along their whole length from possible hostile land. On these it is as much as we can hope to hold fortified posts at either end: in the Atlantic our British and Canadian ports (and the Bermudas), in the North Pacific Esquimaux on Vancouver Island and Hong Kong. Secondly, those that connect Europe eastwardly with Southern Asia—the Cape route, the Red Sea route, and that by the Persian Gulf. We guard our Cape route with the watch ports at Gibraltar and Freetown and Simon’s Bay, and the stations at St. Helena and Ascension (occupied in 1815), while the tiny settlement on Tristan DaCunha prevents any inimical use of it in anticipation of war. In the Indian Ocean Mauritius and its dependencies, Rodrigues, 1809, the Seychelles (1794), the Chagos and Amirante groups and their many smaller neighbors, prolong our line to Ceylon, and it is extended past Further India to North China by the Straits Settlements,

Lebuan, Hong Kong, and Weihaiwei. Gibraltar, Malta (1800), and Cyprus (1878) protect the Mediterranean Road: Aden and Perim (1857) watch the Red Sea mouth, which is further secured by British protectorates over northern Somaliland 1884-6 and Socotra (1886). The Persian Gulf is blocked by our station at Bahrein (1867) well within it, our agency at Muscat, and our ownership of Baluchistan Coast.

“A third series of Trade-routes brings to us the commerce of South America, from both its eastern and its western parts, and most of the sailing-ships that carry Australian wares: on this we have no harbour of our own but the Falklands. But its possible supplanter, the highway that may soon be opened through the Caribbean Sea and Nicaragua and the tropical Pacific, is well guarded for us; though the German flag flies in Samoa, and the French over the eastern groups—Marquesas, Society, and their neighbors—nearly all the other groups are ours; Fiji and Tonga and Hervey, Gilbert and Elice, and southern Melanesia; watched and counted not only by the men of our new Commonwealth in those seas, but by their

fellow-islanders of New Zealand, who hope still as Grey taught them, to be the headquarters of a Polynesian confederacy under the Imperial flag."

In this expansion, India has been the central motive, as stated by the British author quoted above, "To reach India our adventurers threw themselves upon America; to guard the Indian trade we seized South Africa; upon India converge the routes that are dotted from end to end with our forts and coaling stations. And the struggle for India has been a struggle against France. From France we took Canada; and only just ahead of France we secured Australia; it was for fear of France that we deprived Holland of the Cape Colony."*

As pointed out by General Lea, British dominion consists of one-fourth of the land surface, and the suzerainty of the Five Seas. He comments, "It is over this seventeen-twentieths of the world that broods the jealous yet anxious scowl of the Saxon race. That British rule should, in various degrees of sovereignty, exer-

* Jose *ibid.*

cise its dominion over seventeen-twentieths of the world's surface is significant of just that degree of repression toward all other nations, their rights and expansions by land or by sea."*

It is only necessary to visualize the gains made by the British Empire in Asia and Africa, and in Pacific waters, as the results of the World War, to appreciate the significance of the following paragraph by the same authority.†

"It is not so much in the vastness of British possessions that are found conditions provocative of war as it is in its geographical distribution. It is not a segregated sovereignty occupying, as the Russian Empire, a corner or continuous portion of the earth, but forms, on the other hand, a circle around the entire globe, within which is placed all the other powers of the world; and not one of them can follow their lines of natural expansions without, sooner or later, being brought into direct contact with the British Dominion."

In the opinion of General Lea, there are

* Lea, Homer, *The Day of the Saxon*, p. 15.

† *Ibid*, p. 16.

but three countries that possess pre-eminent strategic positions: The British Islands, the Japanese Islands, and India.

“The Indian Empire is in the strategic centre of the third most important portion of the globe. Its influence has had its effect upon the European mind from the earliest times; and in the future the power of its strategic position as a determinate factor in world politics will increase with each international readjustment.”*

* Lea, Homer, *The Day of the Saxon*, p. 63.

CHAPTER II.

ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN INDIA, 1763-1815.

India played an important part in the shaping of British foreign policy as early as 1688, in the reign of William III. Arthur Russell, in his work on British foreign policy writes : "At the outset the object of the foreign policy of England on William's accession was to defeat the project of Louis XIV indirectly in the colonies and India and more directly in Ireland and on the Continent."*

The same author points out that "after the Treaty of Utrecht, the character of the conflict with France and Spain changes, and the issues become more vital. The struggle between Great Britain and the Bourbons is for ascendancy on the sea, in India, in the West Indies and on the American continent."†

Britain's future as a dominant power was assured by the Treaty of Paris, (1763) which

* Russell, Arthur, *History of British Foreign Policy*, p. 157.

† *Ibid.*, p. 172.

established Great Britain as a leading state in the world. Mr. Russell estimates the relative positions of England and France in the following words :* "The peace was the culminating point of British power in the eighteenth century, nay, relatively to all other states, England has never since been so great. The foundation of the British Empire was laid, its future expansion in India and Canada was assured. It was not however, till the fall of Napoleon that the British Empire was free to expand without danger of any serious interruption from external foes."

The period of 1739-1763 has been characterized by Professor Montagu Burrows in his study, "The History of the Foreign policy of Great Britain," as the period in which the dramas enacted on the plains of Bengal and Karnatics paved the way for British supremacy in India.

Referring to the principles that governed British foreign policy during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) he recognized the important elements which have determined Britain's later policy as well. He points out, "In other words,

* *Ibid.*, p. 199.

the recovery of an imperial position by the British people was marked by the welding of the old and the new elements of foreign policy.... The security of the country from invasion was to be guarded as of old by sea supremacy. The coasts of Netherland must be in friendly hands; the colonies must be saved from absorption by the French and Spaniards, who had been for so long a time laying their hostile plans; India must be kept free for the development of British trade and Government; the Mediterranean must be retained at any cost by a sufficient fleet and by the help of its fortified depots at Gibraltar and Minorca. For the latter of these, Malta later on became the substitute.*

Anglo-French hostility during the period of the French Revolution, particularly between the years 1793 and 1800, was intensified by the question of India. As stated by Professor Burrows, "Great Britain would never have given up the struggle for the Mediterranean; Napoleon would never have rested till he had acquired the command of it.... The eyes of the brilliant

* Burrows, Montagu, *The History of the Foreign Policy of Great Britain*, p. 114.

young conqueror (Napoleon) turned towards the alternative of ruining the only country which he really feared, by blocking her way to India through the roads of Egypt and Turkey and by setting up at Constantinople a great French Empire which might gradually tear away India by the help of a French organization of the great Marhatta princes:”*

India was a consideration which influenced French diplomacy in regard to extending aid to the American colonies fighting against Great Britain. Wharton, in his *Diplomatic History of the American Revolution*,† correctly analyses the situation: “It would be a mistake,” he writes, “to attribute the French support of America exclusively to a feeling of revenge for the humiliations of the prior war. Other motives came in and exercised decisive influence. There was a conviction and a right one in France that for Britain to hold under control the whole of North America as well as India would give her a maritime supremacy as well as superiority

* Burrows, *ibid*, p. 197.

† Wharton, *Diplomatic History of the American Revolution*. Vol. I, p. 43.

in wealth which will constitute a standing menace to the rest of the world."

William Pitt, more than any other statesman, was responsible for the policy which led to the triumph of England over France in the Seven Years' War. It was he who realized that France should be defeated, not on the banks of the Rhine, but in her colonies. In the period of reconstruction which followed the treaty of Paris, Pitt was the master mind who made it possible for England to progress on her imperial career.

Discussing Pitt's Foreign Policy in respect to the Orient, Gerald Burkeley Hertz writes as follows:* "Pitt looked beyond the obvious and present facts, and foresaw the cloud that during the following century darkened the horizon of British India. If his means were not wholly happy in 1791, his ends at last have commended themselves to posterity. He sought to strengthen British influence in the East, to enforce peace throughout Europe, to lighten the heavy burden of safe-guarding the north-western

* Hertz, Gerald Burkeley, *British Imperialism in the Eighteenth Century*, pp. 208-209.

frontier of India, and to postpone, for so long a period as might be possible, the extension of Russian sovereignties to the shores of the Mediterranean."

Professor Burrows, referring to Britain's seizure of Dutch territory at the Cape of Good Hope, points out that quite unexpected results resulted from this almost unobserved appropriation. At first it seemed to be useful as commanding the highway to India, but led later to the extension of British power and influence over a large portion of the African continent.*

At the Congress of Vienna (1815) Britain's policy was largely determined by the consideration of obtaining control of the trade routes to India. "Of all that she had taken from France and her allies, she retained only the necessary posts of her commerce in India. The Mediterranean, the West Indies and the German Ocean, the Isle of France, Malta, Tobago, and St. Lucia formed the whole of her (Britain's) gain."†

Since 1827, according to Professor Burrows,

* Hertz, Gerald Burkely, *British Imperialism in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 247.

† *Ibid.*, p. 308.

India has been the centre of Britain's Oriental policy: "She (Britain) had conquered the Mediterranean at the Battle of the Nile; and every day made it more apparent to statesmen that India could not be retained if a hostile power occupied the Levant. Each year also the enormous responsibility which the possession of India meant was brought more and more home to the British nation by dangerous wars and insurrections."*

Earl Curzon, the present British Foreign Minister and former Viceroy of India, in his most remarkable work, "The Problems of the Far East," published in 1894, admits in unmistakable terms that India is the foundation stone of the British Empire. "Whatever the future may bring forth to this country (England)", he writes, "it cannot fail to be a matter of capital importance, seeing that the Empire of Great Britain, though an European, a Canadian, and Australian, is before all else an Asiatic Dominion. We still are, and have it in our hands to remain, the First Power in the

* Burrows, Montagu, *The History of the Foreign Policy of Great Britain*, p. 350.

East. Just as DeTocqueville remarked that the conquest and government of India are really the achievements which have given England her place in the opinion of the world, so it is the prestige and the wealth arising from her Asiatic position that are the foundation stones of the British Empire.”*

* Curzon, Earl, Problems of the Far East, p. 414.

CHAPTER III

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS ON THE INDIAN FRONTIER.

Professor Herbert Adams Gibbons, in referring to the influence of India upon England's foreign relations, says, "None can understand the foreign policy of Great Britain, which has inspired military and diplomatic activities from the Napoleonic Wars to the present day, who does not interpret wars, diplomatic conflicts, treaties and alliances, territorial annexations, extensions of protectorates, with the fact of India constantly in mind."

The advent of Russia on the Indian frontier after the French danger had paled and vanished, is described by Arthur Jose, in a graphic manner: "And then from the landward, across the deserts and the mountain ranges of our north-eastern frontier, loomed up the shadow of a more gigantic rival, of whom little

was understood and nothing could be predicted but unremitting progress and increasing power.

The First Afghan War, in 1838, resulted in the penetration of Russian agents into Afghanistan and the friendly reception accorded to them by the ruler of that state. William Cargill points out that during Palmerstone's administration because of the Indian question there was constant conflict between Russian and British policies.

He analyses the situation as follows :
“According to what we have here been advancing, the objects of Russia; as laid down by Peter the Great are :—

1. The acquisition of Turkey, and seizure of Constantinople.

2. The domination of Persia and Central Asia.

3. The possession of the Black Sea, the Caspian and the extension of influence to the Levant and Mediterranean and possession of India.”*

Referring to Britain's anti-French and anti-

* Cargill, pp. 25-26.

Russian policy even after the Franco-Prussian War Professor Charles Cestre, writes :*

“After 1870, England at first remained faithful to the policy which, with few exceptions had been the constant rule for her exterior relations, namely, more or less direct co-operation with the states of Central Europe against France and Russia....France, despite her reverses, continued to be the distrusted neighbor. She stood at the gates of the channel, she was a great seapower, and since the consolidation of her Algerian possessions, she was a great Mediterranean power as well. Russia was the suspected neighbor at the frontiers of India, disturbing on account of the incessant growth of her population, her uninterrupted penetration of Asia and her desire to open a way into the Mediterranean. Consequently there was a tendency on the part of England, without abandoning her Insular reserve, to favor the policy of Germany and Austria and to check the policy of France and Russia.” According to the same authority

* Cestre, Charles, France, England and European Democracy, 1215-1915 p. 73.

“England could not allow Russia to use the disturbance in the Balkans as a pretext to enter Constantinople and become more than ever a menace to India.”* England consequently declared herself protectress of Turkey. He further comments: “After having constructed a barrier in the Congress of Berlin against the ‘Russian Spectre’ Disraeli prepared an era of conquering experience in Africa and Asia.”†

Professor Burrows refers to Anglo-Russian relations in the following terms: “Lord Beaconsfields’s policy towards Russia was due to India. The specific points are (1) buying of the Suez Canal, (2) Securing of Cyprus as the British station at Levant—as a result of the Crimean War, (3) Restraining Russia from being all powerful regarding Turkish questions, menacing Britain in Asia, particularly in India.”‡

At this point England was not in a position to take Egyptian territory, she had no position in Egypt close to the canal itself, and thus

* Cestre, p. 75.

† *Ibid*, p. 76.

‡ Burrows, p. 353.

Cyprus, as the nearest island to the Suez Canal, offered special advantages. After the treaty of San Stefano and the revision of the Russo-Turkish treaty at Berlin, in 1778, the interest of Great Britain was directed to the south-east Mediterranean. "She decided that her permanent route to India was through the Suez Canal, and made it secure by getting possession of the majority of the shares of the Canal and by seizing Egypt."*

Lt. Col. S. C. Vestal, in his recent book, confirms the judgment of earlier writers in respect to the influence which India has had on the course of Anglo-Russian relations. He says, "It is customary to class Anglo-Saxons as the least militant, the least war-like of the race. The fact is that these nations are the most war-like of living peoples. They are so war-like that they will not suffer any nation on the same continent or island with themselves against whom it is necessary to keep a large standing army on foot."†

* Gibbons, Herbert Adams, *The New Map of Europe*, p. 140.

† Vestal, Lt. Col. S. C. *The Maintenance of Peace*.

“The Anglo-Saxon world taken as a unit has no frontier in close contact with a powerful nation. Its boundaries are formed by the sea or by the territories of weak people, from whom there is no cause to fear invasion. The north-west frontier of India is an apparent exception, but it is only apparent. The Russian territory is still a long way from the vital part of India; the frontier is strong by nature and has been strengthened by art; and the British have abundant means to bring to bear on Russia in other parts of the world whenever the northwest frontier is threatened. Nevertheless, it is true that the British foreign policy for seventy years has been dominated by the necessity of keeping Russia at a safe distance from India.”*

Disraeli, speaking in the house of Commons on July 18, 1878, said, “Our Indian Empire is on every occasion on which these discussions occur or these troubles occur, or these settlements occur—(he was referring to the Berlin Treaty of 1878) our Indian Empire is to England a source of grave anxiety, and the time appeared

* Vestal, Lt.-Col. S. C., *The Maintenance of Peace* p. 55.
(This paragraph was written in 1912).

to have arrived, when, if possible, we should terminate that anxiety....But yielding to Russia what she has obtained, we may say to her— 'Thus far and no further !' Asia is large enough for both of us. There is no reason for these constant wars or fears of wars between Russia and England. But the room we require we must secure. We therefore entered into an alliance—a defensive alliance with Turkey to guard her against any further attack from Russia.' '*

In the period following the Treaty of Berlin (1878) Russian relations with the Balkan countries produced a reaction against her in the minds of English conservatives. Russia's approach to Constantinople filled them with consternation, for Constantinople guarded the gateway into Asia. Russian expansion into Central Asia alarmed the British government and one of the means chosen to offset it was the creation of a buffer state out of Afghanistan. In retaliation, Russia tried to extend her influence all around Afghanistan, in Persia, in Turkestan, and followed this by the occupation

* Jones, Edgar R. *Selected Speeches on British Foreign Policy, 1738-1914* pp. 93-98.

of strategic trade centers in Central Asia. Tibet, a province of China, adjoining India on the north-eastern boundary, became the counter goal of Russia, as an offset to British gains in Afghanistan. The rival claims of Russia and Britain in Persia were compromised by the Anglo-Persian Convention of 1907. Nevertheless, this country, as well as Afghanistan and Tibet, became to the government of India, and to the British foreign office safe-guards which must be added to the British Empire.

Next came the menace to India through Russia's approach to the Persian Gulf and her interest in Bagdad Railway. At this point a new rival threatened British prestige in the East, and the enmity formerly directed toward Russia was diverted to Germany. "Having compounded colonial rivalries with France and Russia, she had no way of arriving at a diplomatic understanding with Germany. The Bagdad Railway question was decided on battle-fields from Flanders to Mesopotamia."*

* Gibbons, Herbert Adams, *The New Map of Asia* p. 12.

CHAPTER IV.

THE APPROACHES TO INDIA—THE SUEZ CANAL.

After 1870 the rivalry between British and French colonial ambitions centred chiefly around the question of domination in Africa. The interest of France in the trade with the Levant and her protectorate in Algeria made her keenly sensitive to anything that related to the North African seaboard. In 1875, Great Britain secured a dominant position in this region through the purchase of shares in the Suez Canal Company. There is no doubt that in this negotiation Disraeli had in mind the prospect of uniting India more closely to England.

Gladstone, describing in 1877 the British Government's position in this matter stated that the first and fundamental proposition was the preservation of British dominion in the East, and that this was only less important than the pre-

servation of British National independence. He pointed out the following factors which threatened British control of the Mediterranean route to India.*...“The bare possibility of Russia's obtaining the command of the Bosphorus makes it a matter of urgent necessity that we should secure our route to India—the route of which we must be masters, is the route of the Suez Canal.... It is held that the canal must be kept open to our ships at all times and under all circumstances—the command of the canal involves the occupation of the delta of the Nile. This is called in some passages, the occupation of Egypt.

In 1880, an English writer, the Hon. Mr. Cowen, in considering the relation of the Suez Canal to India, wrote: “The Suez Canal is the link which unites our eastern and western empires. Through it we not only reach India, but our dependencies in the Chinese Seas, our Australian colonies, the Mauritius, and the British settlements on the East coast of Africa. It is the neck which connects the head with the

* Gladstone, William E. *Agression on Egypt and Freedom of the East*. Originally published in the 19th century, 1877.

extremities of the Empire....We have got the Canal, and in the interest of ourselves and the world we will keep it free from every one at all hazard. If Russia was to obtain political supremacy on either side of the Bosphorus she would stop the canal or intercept our way to India by the Euphrates Valley....This position is the key to Europe—and one of its arteries. Its occupation by conquering ambitions and despotic power would be a danger to England, to Europe and to Liberty.”*

Dr. Geffcken says regarding the value of this route, “There can be no doubt that India forms the most vital point in the British Empire beyond the sea; consequently the whole energy of the British statesmen ought to be directed, on the one hand, to securing the Northwest frontier threatened by Russia, and on the other, to keeping the way clear, from England to the Peninsula of the Ganges. In former times, England grasped in a masterly way the necessity of obtaining solid pillars on which this road is built. Down to the cutting of the Isthmus of

* Cowen. *Foreign Policy of England*, p. 9.

the Suez, the only road to India was that around the Cape.”*

The great naval authority, Admiral Mahan, summarized the strategic value of Egypt to the British Empire in the following words: “In military situation, Egypt approaches an ideal; for, to a local concentration of force, defensive and offensive, operative in two directions towards Gibraltar or towards India, it adds several streams of supply, so diverse in origin that no one navy can take position to intercept them all. ...If the Mediterranean be blocked, the Red Sea remains, always the shortest route to India.... The truer solution for a state already holding Malta and Gibraltar would seem to be to grasp Egypt firmly, to consolidate local tenure there, and to establish in India, Australia and the Cape sources of necessary supply—whether manufactories or depots—in ammunitions and stores, against the chance of temporary interruption on the side of England.”†

In the concluding paragraph of his book,

* Geffcken. *The British Empire*.

† Mahan, Admiral A. T. *The Problem of Asia*, 1900, p. 82.

“The Sea Road to the East,” A. C. Sargeant writes: “We have approached India from the Northwest, by the passages of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal; and we have seen how our interests in the Mediterranean, at first purely European, have become more and more related to the control of the seaway to India. Southwest is the older route by the way of the Atlantic and the Cape, a route still valuable for some purposes. There the control of the route leads us to the occupation of the neighbouring mainland of Africa. Southeast again we reach Australia, either directly across the ocean, or threading the island group of Malayas; while the Indian Ocean has its own system of minor local routes.” So we have the lines of traffic from every part of the world converging on the Indian region, with its vast trade and swarming population; the natural junction of all these sea-roads, great and small, is Colombo, close to the mainland of the Peninsula, yet at the same time well out in the sea, the centre of control from which India reaches out in every direction and dominates the Indian Ocean.”*

* Sargeant, *A. C. Sea Road to the East*.

In his work, "Seaways of the Empire," Mr. Sargeant writes: "The Suez Canal is an important factor in the Australian traffic while the movement through it to and from the East and South Africa must not be entirely neglected. For the rest of the traffic between Europe, the Indian Ocean and the whole seaboard of Eastern Asia, the Canal is the only route which we need consider."

The important relation of the Canal as the link between Europe and Asia is beyond doubt; the master of that route is to a large extent master of the political relations between Europe and Asia. Thus it is that to-day Great Britain is a great Asiatic power. The rise of nationalist sentiment in Egypt has affected Great Britain's tenure in the East, which she consolidated in 1882, but today, while she is willing to make concessions to Egypt, she is determined to keep control over the canal, for purposes of imperial communication, and to safeguard India.

CHAPTER V.

THE APPROACHES TO INDIA—THE PERSIAN GULF.

No better statement of British policy in Persia can be made than that contained in a despatch from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India, in Council, dated September 1899.* “The strategical interests of Great Britain in Persia arise from conditions with which India is most intimately concerned. Long before the boundries of British India extended to their present limits or before Russia had become a great Central Asian Power approaching or impinging upon many points upon the Indian frontiers, the fortunes of Persia, though at that time not a conterminous country, had become a matter of vital concern to the British dominion in India. In the early years of the present century, when the ambitions of France were the main sources of apprehension,

* British Blue Book, Persia No. 1. 1908.

INDIA'S POSITION IN WORLD POLITICS

it was through Persia that a blow at the British supremacy was expected to be struck, and that an invasion of India was planned. The same idea has reappeared at intervals since. Now the boundaries of Afganistan, which have been demarcated and guaranteed by Great Britain, march for many hundred miles with those of Persia; that Persian territory is also conterminous for hundreds of miles with Baluchistan, a state under a British protectorate and in large measure actually administered by the officers of the government of India; and that the sea that washes the southern coasts of Persia is one in which, both from its proximity to the Indian Ocean and as a result of the exertions of the past century, Indian interests and influence have become supreme—it is clear that Persia has assumed a strategical importance in relation to British India, which might not be serious were the resources or the designs of that country itself alone to be considered; which is indisputably great, when it is remembered that closely pressing upon Persia and Afghanistan is the ever-growing momentum of a power whose interests in Asia are not always in accord with

our own, and that the Persian Gulf is beginning to attract the interest of the other and sometimes rival nations. These conditions, however, while they indicate the supreme concern which those who are responsible for the government of India cannot fail to feel in the fortunes of Persia, are nevertheless sufficiently obvious in their general application to render it unnecessary for us to point out their far more than local range, or to argue that they affect not merely the destinies of British dominion in India, but those of the British Empire....Whilst it may be presumed that these pledges (Russian pledges for the integrity of Persia) so frequently renewed, are still in existence we are not of opinion that they are in themselves quite sufficient to arrest the centripetal progress of Russian influence in Persia or to save the Persian kingdom or British interests in it from the erosive agencies that we have described. Within the limits of a nominally still existing integrity and independence many encroachments upon both these attributes are possible, that by almost imperceptible degrees, they pass into the realm of constitutional fiction, where they continue to provide an

exercise for the speculations of the jurists long after they have been contemptuously ignored by statesmen. Neither will it be overlooked by Her Majesty's government, that while such engagement with Russia might preclude that Power from obtaining control over Central and Southern Persia and in that way reach the Persian Gulf, it would not for one moment retard, might on the contrary accelerate, her advance to the same objective through Mesopotamia by way of Bagdad....We should strongly deprecate the political rivalry of any European power in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf, even though such a situation, while fraught with constant annoyance, might not, as in the case of Russia, constitute a positive menace to the Indian Empire."

Valentine Chirol in the preface to his valuable work—"*The Middle Eastern Question or Some Political Problems of Indian Defence*" relates that he was impressed while journeying through Persia in 1902-03 with the rapidity with which events were moving in the "immutable East."

"Under the impact of Western forces," he

writes, "the disintegration of Asia is proceeding apace, and new conditions are being evolved which, within a period perhaps no longer very remote, will seriously affect, both directly and indirectly the position of our Indian Empire."*

Throughout the nineteenth century Persia had a threefold interest for England, due to the intrinsic importance of her position as a great Asiatic power, to her potentiality as a valuable ally in case of attack against India, and to the value of the Persian trade, which was largely an Anglo-Indian trade, and therefore intimately connected with interests of British India. Persia dominated geographically the "Middle East," those regions in Asia which extend to the borders of India or command the approaches to India. Chirol, in commenting on the Middle Eastern question said that it is itself only a part of a much larger question upon which the future of Asia depends. "It is a continuation of the same question with which we have long been familiar in the Near East. It is closely

* Chirol, Valentine. *The Middle Eastern Question or some Political Problems of Indian Defence*, p. viii.

connected with the more novel development of international rivalry in the Far East. It is the outcome of that constant projection of European forces—moral, commercial, and military—into Asia which is slowly but steadily transforming all the conditions that enabled us to achieve, and so far to retain, as the masters of India, a position of unparalleled ascendancy in the Asiatic Continent.”*

Referring to Russian influence in Persia, Chirol writes at this period (1903) “That question is whether Asia is really a field in which there is room for two of the greatest European powers to fulfill their peaceful mission in friendly competition, or whether their rivalry must ultimately degenerate into a struggle for exclusive mastery.”†

He comments further: “But it is necessary also to recognize that the extension of her (Russia’s) power has already seriously affected the position of our Indian Empire, and that its further extension might have still graver results. Without going back further than the last two

* *Ibid*, p. 5.

† Chirol. *Ibid*, p. 18.

decades, it is obviously the rapid growth of Russia's power in Asia which has alone compelled India to carry out a vast and costly scheme of defensive armaments on her north-west frontier."*

The solution advanced by Mr. Chirol is as follows: "To restore the balance of power in Persia is a practical policy and it is not too late to prosecute it with success. But it can be prosecuted with success only by concentrating our efforts within well defined limits....Our commercial and political base is the Persian Gulf. Both politically and commercially it is of the utmost urgency that we should open up roads from our base into the interior."†

In his concluding chapter, this keen student of Eastern affairs asks, "How is the position we were able to acquire, and have hitherto held, in Asia by our control of the sea to be upheld under new conditions, in which land power is tending to become a factor only less essential to its retention than sea-power?"

* Chirol. *Ibid*, p. 290.

† Chirol, pp. 304-5.

India is, and must remain, the key of that position. More than that, it has grown to be, if not the corner stone of the British Empire, at least one of the chief bases of its security.”*

Advocating a vigorous policy in Persia for the protection of British interests in India, he says: “Within the regions where we have no very important material interests to guard, and where the ascendancy of a great military power need not immediately or appreciably react upon the safety of India, we are certainly not called upon to be more Persian than the Persians, or to adopt an attitude of gratuitous opposition to Russia. But in the East and South of Persia there are regions in which the presence of Russia, or, for the matter of that, if it were conceivable, the presence of any other foreign military power, would inevitably constitute a grave potential menace to the peace and security of India..... If Russia proved as reasonable as her champions anticipate, a big step would have been taken towards removing the atmosphere of suspicion which on both

* Chisolm. *Ibid*, p. 394.

sides, at present vitiates our relations with her The worst of all policies is the policy of drift, for those who take refuge in it invariably end by being its dupes. In China it led us into a mass of embarrassments from which we have not yet extricated ourselves even with the help of the Japanese alliance. Where, as in Southern and Eastern Persia, the security of India is concerned it might well land us in a national catastrophe.”*

On May 5, 1903 Lord Lansdowne made the following declaration: “We, His Majesty’s Government should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified fort in the Persian Gulf by another Power as a very grave menace to British interests, which we should certainly resist with all the means at our disposal.”

One authority, writing in this same year, preferred to regard the whole of Persia as the British sphere of influence. He points out that in actual fact the whole of Persia would be commercially speaking in the British net, as far as textile manufacturers were concerned, if a

* Chirol. *Ibid.*, p. 308.

British railway was only pushed as far north as Hamadan and Teheran. "The whole aim and object of our policy in Persia first and last should be railways. Russia may have all the political prestige she wants as long as we control the railways from the gulf to Teheran."*

Four years later, in 1907, the Anglo-Russian treaty was made, which divided Persia into three zones, the north being apportioned to Russia, and the south to England, leaving Persia a strip of arid territory in the centre.

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 settled the disputes of these nations in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, the three shields of British India. Professor Seymour admirably sums up the causes which led up to this reversal of the century-old enmity between Russia and England into amity and co-operation. The sudden and surprising reconciliation of Great Britain and Russia was chiefly facilitated by the attitude of each nation towards Germany. Great Britain was consumed with fear of the economic development of that nation and believed herself

* Whigham, J. H. *The Persian Problem*, p. 392.

threatened directly by its world policy ; the same factors that had led to her reconciliation with France made for an understanding with Russia. Russia, on the other hand, after seeing her dream of Far Eastern domination shattered, was not grateful to Germany who was largely responsible for the aggressive policy of Russia in China and Manchuria. Furthermore, the activity of Russia, checked in the Far East, must inevitably be turned towards the Balkans and Constantinople, and in this quarter Russian ambitions conflicted with Germany's purpose of controlling a sweep of territory extending from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf."*

Germany's growing strength as a maritime power had already caused apprehension in British minds. The words that Chatham applied to France, were remembered and applied to Germany. "Our first duty is to see that France does not become a naval, commercial and colonial power." With the development of Germany as a world power, menacing

* Seymour, Charles, *The Diplomatic Background of the War. 1870-1914*, p. 160.

the maritime empire of Great Britain, the policy which had heretofore been directed towards France, and Russia, was applied to Germany. Anglo-Russian and Anglo-French relations were adjusted, the latter by the Entente Cordial of 1904, and the former through the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which in turn became the medium through which the Triple Entente was built up. Concurrently with this diplomatic revolution was carried out the policy of the encirclement of Germany, until in 1914 Triple Alliance and Triple Entente faced the issue on the field of battle. Not least among the causes leading to this conflict was the question of the Bagdad Railway, or, the land route to India.

CHAPTER VI

THE BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS PERSIAN GULF AND THE BERLIN-BAGDAD RAILWAY.

The significance of Anglo-German rivalry which culminated in the World War was foreseen as early as 1903 by that astute writer on eastern affairs, Valentine Chirol. Under the general heading of "The Balance of Power,"* he refers to the effect on Britain's imperial interests of the advent of Germany in Central Asia. He called attention to the fact that it was not only British commercial supremacy that would be challenged if other nations once gained a foothold in the Persian Gulf. He said, "The whole balance of naval and military power in this part of Asia would inevitably be affected, and we should have no Japan upon whom we would call in to redress it in our favor." This mention of Japan obviously refers to the Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1902. He continues,

* Chirol, p. 262.

“To anyone who is at all intimately acquainted with international politics the idea that we could rely upon the appearance of Germany on the scene to act as a counterpoise to Russia must seem quite as futile as that Russia’s policy of expansion in Asia can be arrested by graceful concessions. India would be for the first time for upwards of a century be exposed to attack from a naval base within close proximity to her shores, and though that is a danger against which she could be protected so long as we preserve our command of the sea, it would mean an additional task for our Navy and involve a substantial increase of the naval force permanently stationed in our Indian waters.”

It is interesting to note that Chirol quotes the American naval authority, Admiral Mahan, with the greatest respect.* Admiral Mahan, had pointed out that Great Britain was more intimately concerned in the fortunes of Turkey and Persia. He laid down three conditions “deep struck and closely intertwined in the soil of a past history.”

* Chirol, p. 264.

“First her security in India, which would be materially affected by an adverse change in the political control of the Gulf; secondly, the safety of the great sea route, commercial and military, to India and the Farther East, on which British shipping is still actually the chief traveller, though with a notable diminution that demands national attention; and, thirdly, the economic and commercial welfare of India, which can act politically only through the Empire, a dependence which greatly enhances obligations. The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign state of considerable naval potentiality, a fleet is being there based upon a strong military port, would reproduce the relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar, and Malta to the Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes to the Farther East, to India, and to Australia, the last two actually internal to the Empire regarded as a political system; and although at present Great Britain unquestionably would check such a fleet so placed, by a division of her own, it might well require a detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength of her naval position.”

The position of the British government was clearly defined on May 1903, when Lord Lansdowne declared that "we (i.e. his Majesty's Government) should regard the establishment of a naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to British interests which we should certainly resist with all the means at our disposal."

In 1888 a railway concession in Asia Minor had been granted to a group of Germans, backed by the Deutsche Bank. The first concession was followed by another which extended the railway to Konia. After the second visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II to Constantinople in 1898, another concession was granted in 1899 by the Ottoman government which contemplated the extension of the railway from Konia to the Persian Gulf. The German financiers applied to the Turkish government for a *firman*, which was granted in 1903, thus creating the Bagdad Railway Company. The only practical terminus was at Koweit, on the Persian Gulf. In 1899 Colonel Meade, the British resident of the Persian Gulf, signed with the Sheik of Koweit, a secret convention which assured to him "special protec-

tion" if he would make no concession of territory without the knowledge and consent of the British government. When a German mission appeared at Koweit in 1900 to arrange the concession for the terminus they were refused. In 1901 a Turkish vessel was sent to Koweit to enforce the authority of the Sublime Porte, but British warships and British bluejackets upheld the *independence* of Koweit.*

Failing in obtaining the Persian Gulf Terminus, Germany finally secured concessions for a branch line from Aleppo to the Mediterranean, terminating at Alexandretta, and another concession for the construction of a fortified port at Alexandretta. This would give Germany a naval base eight hours from Cyprus and thirty-six hours from the Suez Canal.†

In the opinion of Professor Morris Jastrow, "The Bagdad Railway was the largest single contributing factor to the world war."‡

The following quotations are taken from

* Gibbons, Herbert Adams, *The New Map of Europe* pp. 65-66.

† Gibbons, *ibid*, p. 69.

‡ Jastrow, Morris. *The Berlin Bagdad Railway* p. 194.

that unique volume, *Entente Diplomacy and the World*, by De Siebert and Schreiner. It is composed of the diplomatic documents and correspondence of the imperial Russian Government, which the writers believed would repose forever in the secret archives of the governments concerned. Beyond all doubt they reveal the attitudes of the imperial Russian and British Governments towards the German project of the Bagdad Railway. This particular interchange of correspondence took place in 1909. The British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Iswolsky (Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs)*: “..... My government is most desirous of learning the conditions under which the Russian Government would take part in the railway north of Bagdad.

“We have always demanded the control and construction of the line south of Bagdad and cannot content ourselves with less. No doubt can exist that the railway will be built eventually, whether England and Russia take a part or not, and from this point of view, England must give serious consideration to the present situation and

* De Siebert and Schreiner *Entente Diplomacy and the world* p. 505.

the Gwinner proposals. But before anything further be done in the matter Grey would like to have Russia's opinion. There is one reason which makes the question of the southern section of the railway a most urgent one; the Turkish Government is starting irrigation work south of Bagdad, and it is probable that the rivers will cease to be navigable owing to lack of water. The river-transport of Anglo-Indian commerce, which has been in British hands for more than fifty years, would thus be utterly lost, without any possibility of a substitute until the railway is built."

That the projected railway and the possibility of an Anglo-German agreement was viewed with some apprehension by France is evidenced by the following letter from the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople to Iswolosky dated December 8, 1909. "The English communications have made a painful impression on the Paris Cabinet. One naturally concedes England's fair behaviour in this matter and that she has kept her promise to consider, together with France and Russia, a possible understanding with Germany concerning the Bagdad Rail-

way. But one can read between the lines of the English communication that England is very desirous of accepting the German proposals, although the latter are not at all in keeping with French interests and hardly do justice to ours.

“According to the contents, the projected treaty is of the greatest importance; it is equivalent to the partition of Turkey into a British and a German sphere of interest; England granting Germany freedom of action in Turkey, in Europe and in Asia Minor, and claiming such for herself only in the Turkish territories in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf.

“The French Ambassador is of the opinion that England is more and more concentrating all her energies on the domination of the roads leading to India,—the Persian Gulf and the Indian Plains—and England appears to be less and less interested in Constantinople and the Turkish problems proper. The London Cabinet has safeguarded itself by its conventions with Russia against an extension of Russian influence in the Persian Gulf. The projected treaty with Germany completes England's sovereignty in the Persian Gulf. England will then attempt to

free herself in Egypt from the obligations to obtain Turkey's sanction in certain political and financial matters and once this end is attained, England will no longer take an active part in the other questions."* .

In 1910 discussion of the Bagdad Railway between Britain and Russia centred around the possibility of linking up the Russian and Indian railways in Persia. The Russian Ambassador at London reported to Sazonoff, on December 15, 1910, as follows: "Even if the fear of an invasion of India by Russia has now vanished, yet too close a connection of the Bagdad Railway with the Indian railways through Persia creates no inconsiderable difficulties. A strategical main line beginning in Turkey would thus exist: this circumstance must be taken into serious consideration nowadays when Islam appears to be awaking everywhere"†

Apparently in 1914, Britain was still suspicious of Russia's position in Persia. Sazonoff wrote to the Russian Ambassador at London on

* De Siebert and Schreiner, *ibid.* p. 511.

† De Siebert and Schreiner, *ibid.* p. 527.

June 25, 1914 as follows: “.....I had another long conversation, yesterday, with the British Ambassador, whose attention I called to the serious danger of a cooling of our relations to England on account of the Persian question. I assumed that the perturbation and excitement, which had been noticeable of late in England, were most likely to be traced back to the fact, that fears, as to the position of England in India, were once more becoming manifest. Sir George Buchanan conceded that my assumption was for the greater part correct. In consequence, I once more repeated to him all the arguments which prove how unfounded all such fears are, and I even hinted that, should it be desired, we could give to the British Government, and to public opinion there, reassuring declarations in regard to this in the most decisive form. “

“I have for the present contented myself with these hints; yet it seems to me quite possible that, later on, in connection with our further negotiations, we might propose to England to give her a guarantee of her Indian posses-

sions, as effective as that, given her by Japan in 1902.”*

On July 2, 1914, one month before the outbreak of the World War, the Russian Ambassador at London replied to the above communication, in the following words, “.....inasmuch as the security of India is a consequence of the political entente between Russia and England, it follows that public opinion in England, as well as the British Government, in full confidence as to our intentions, have no fears, so long as this entente exists. Should this entente come to an end, there would be a revival of the fear in question.....

“This does not, however, preclude the possibility of finding, in connection, with certain modifications of our present agreements, a formula which would give expression to the security of India in a still more direct manner; this would merely make our entente still closer.”†

It is to be inferred from the general tenor of this correspondence, that the “formula” to

* Ibid, p. 732.

† De Siebert and Schreiner, *ibid.* p. 733.

be sought was a naval convention between Britain and Russia, similar to, and concurrent with that entered into between Britain and France, the existence of which is admitted in the last letter quoted above, although Sir Edward Grey had denied the existence of such a convention.

CHAPTER VII

ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AS INFLUENCED BY INDIA.

The first agreement, concluded in 1902, between Great Britain and Japan purported to be concerned only with English interests in China and Japanese interests in China and Korea. It was a matter of common knowledge that the impelling motive was fear of Russian expansion in Central Asia which had advanced step by step until it threatened Anglo-Japanese interests in the Far East. It has not been so generally recognized that, as stated in the correspondence discovered in the secret archives of Russia, that it likewise offered secret guarantees for the protection of India. In the agreement signed at London in 1905 and that of 1911 India is specifically referred to. Two of the three clauses which constitute the preamble of this important treaty deal with India.

Article A.—The consolidation and maintenance of
the general peace in the regions of
Eastern Asia and India.

Article C.—The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High-Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India and the defense of their special interests in those regions.

Anglo-Japanese rivalry is very deep ; whenever a responsible Japanese merchant or traveler or educator or journalist goes to India he is followed by British spies. This rivalry has economic and political backgrounds, as in the case of Anglo-German rivalry. Japan is challenging British commercial and political supremacy in the Far east. This challenge is resented by the British, and they will retaliate at an opportune moment. The sooner Japan and the Japanese people realize it the better it will be for their national safety and for the cause of the world peace. Mr. Ellis Barker sees that the root of Anglo-Japanese rivalry lies in the struggle for the control of the trade of Asia, and particularly, the trade of India. He presents the following facts. "The development of Japan's export trade in the Far East has been amazing. During the decade of 1904-1913 her exports to

China have trebled, and so have her exports to British India. Between 1904 and 1917 Japan's export to China have grown six fold and those to India ten fold.....The vast development which the Japanese industries have secured during the struggle (the World War) will before long, no doubt, affect the commercial position in the Far East, for Japan may be expected to concentrate her energies once more upon the gigantic markets of Asia.....Great Britain is strongly, one might say vitally, interested in the Asiatic markets, and especially in the Indian market, which is by far the most important market of Lancashire. India takes the bulk of British cottons. Now it must be remembered that the cotton industry has become the most important industry of Japan.....Japan after having completed the economic conquest of China, may begin and complete the economic conquest of India. That would be Lancaster's ruin, for the bulk of Lancaster's manufactures are sold in that country. It is only reasonable that Japan strives to dominate with her manufactures the Chinese market, but it is equally

reasonable that the Indian markets should be reserved to the inhabitants of the Empire."*

Some Japanese publicists and statesmen think that the Japanese people will not be disposed to aid Britain in putting down Indian aspirations for national independence. Kawakami states, "The provision of the existing treaty of alliance as to Japan's duty with regard to India is not clear. Suppose India rose in rebellion while England's hands were full in Europe; would Japan be required to quell the insurrection in virtue of the alliance? Japan would undoubtedly prefer British rule for India to German or Russian domination, if the country had to be dominated by some European power, but the point is that she would be reluctant to take part in crushing the just aspiration of the Hindus for independence and freedom."†

Although the Anglo-Japanese 'alliance of 1911 was automatically continued in 1921 after careful consideration by the British government, the real reason was not any special love for

* Barker, Ellis, *Economic Statesmanship*. pp. 434-442.

† Kawakami, K.K., *Japan in World Politics*, p. 264.

Japan but from fear that Japan's policy might be antagonistic to British occupation in India. An Oriental student of eastern foreign relations confirms the theory that should Britain discontinue the alliance she would be confronted with Japanese resentment, and this resentment would "surely manifest itself in hostile fomentation of rebellions in India and Egypt and other territories, if not in entering into alliance with the enemies of Great Britain."*

It is only a question of time when Japanese statesmen will recognize that a free India will be of greater benefit to Japanese interests and may serve as a source of strength and security to Japan.

* Bau. M.J. The Foreign Relations of China p. 146.

CHAPTER VIII

ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS AS INFLUENCED BY INDIA.

Anglo-Chinese relations have been intimately connected with the history of British India. In 1792 a special embassy was sent to Peking on behalf of the East Indian Company, under the leadership of Earl McCartney. The specific object of this mission was to open up Chinese ports to British trade, but no success was achieved at this time.

An early precedent for the invasion of the territorial integrity of China occurred in 1802, and it is significant that this was done by order of Lord Wellesley, Governor-General of India. Macao was occupied for the purpose of protecting that port, on behalf of Portugal, against a possible French attack.

Chong Su See, in his work, "Foreign Trade of China", relates: "The Chinese rightly remonstrated against this forcible possession of their territory, and demanded that the troops

depart promptly, at the same time making it absolutely clear that Macao was an integral part of the Celestial Empire, and that the Portugese were allowed to remain in the place merely as tenants at will, paying an annual rental to the Chinese government. Happily, news of the Peace of Amiens soon reached China and the troops withdrew.”*

Six years later by order of another Governor-General of India, Lord Minto, another invasion of China took place, when a detachment of soldiers was sent to Macao. It is further related in Dr. Chong Su See's book† that the court of Directors of the East India Company maintained that “no apprehension need be entertained of embarrassment from the Chinese government, if permission were obtained from the Portuguese for that purpose.” The Chinese remonstrance was unheeded, and when they suspended trade and denied provisions to the British ships the British Admiral, Drury, refused to re-embark his men, and informed the Chinese officials that

* See, Chong Su, *The Foreign Trade of China*, p. 74.

† *Ibid.* p. 75.

his instructions had not forbidden him to declare war against the Chinese nation if necessary. When he attempted to force his way to Canton, he was met with armed resistance, and desisted from the attempt.

Another expedition which set out from England in 1816 likewise was unsuccessful, for the Chinese were alarmed by the British expansion in India, where the British had subdued Nepal, a feudatory of China.

The Opium War of 1840 and the so-called Opium War of 1856 were waged against China by Great Britain for the purpose of not only securing territorial and port concessions, but because of their insistence in carrying on the opium trade because it accrued profit to British East India.

Discussing Anglo-Chinese relations, Dr. M. J. Bau shows that British encroachments on Chinese Territories were directed from the side of India, and were influenced by considerations of Indian policy. He quotes the statement of Bonar Law made in the House of Commons on November 27, 1911, who, while disclaiming that Britain has any desire for territorial acquisitions,

stated that there was one limitation on this principle. "There are certain places," he said, "lying next to British possessions or perhaps strategically commanding important British routes" which Great Britain could not see pass into other hands.

Pursuing this policy Great Britain seized Burma and Sikkim during the period when China was suffering the loss of her dependencies to various European nations, and at a later period she extended her influence over Tibet. In 1904 she entered into treaty with Tibet which stipulated that British consent was to be obtained before any territorial concessions were made to any other power. In 1906 she signed a treaty with China in which she promised not to annex Tibetan territory, but by 1915, when she realized that Russia had established a joint sovereignty over Mongolia, she demanded similar privileges in Tibet. This extension of British power at the expense of China has added immeasurably to the resources and wealth of the Indian Empire.

China has suffered a good deal at the hands of the British nation. The encroachments on China were directed from India and inspired by

the purpose of strengthening the British hold on India. From Suez to Hongkong—this entire route must be under British control. To carry out this policy she has carried out a ruthless policy of subjugation against any nation, European, Asian or African, which stood in her way. So far she has been successful, and invariably her success has been due to her command of India's man-power, her raw materials, and her strategic position. India has been instrumental in bringing sorrow and distress to Persia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Tibet, Burma, Siam, China, Arabia, Turkey, and Mesopotamia. It is India's duty to help these nations in their struggle against Imperialism as well as she strives to throw off her own bonds.

In terms of past history and mutual interest, India has many reasons for regarding China with sympathy and friendship.

CHAPTER IX

INDIA AND BRITISH MILITARISM.

British militarism and navalism are the pillars on which the British Empire rests. Sir John Seeley says in his book, "The Expansion of England," "We found that the Government (British India) did not rest as in England, upon the consent of the people or of some native constituency which has created the government by a constitutional process.....There is only one body or persons of which we can positively affirm that without its support the government could not stand; this is the army."

India is kept under subjection through two forces (1) Britain's ability to utilize Indian manpower and resources against India and (2) Britain's ability to use world political forces through a series of alliances and understandings with other nations. To offset the first weapon used by Britain against Indian aspirations has been applied the Progressive Non-Co-operation

movement in India. To offset and overcome the second means we need to establish foreign relations of our own.

In this connection let it be clearly understood that one of the causes of failure in the struggle for Independence of India in 1857 was the lack of foreign relations with various nations, such as Italy established during her struggle for independence. Though Azimullah Khan was in Turkey and Russia, and it was understood that Persia would aid India, the aid did not come. Britain succeeded in securing Turkey's aid by playing the game of the Russian bogey during the Crimean War. In fact, it was the fear that Russia would enter the Indian situation which induced Britain to enter the Crimean War on the side of Turkey. Turkey sided with Britain to such an extent that the Sultan issued a *firman* asking the Mohamedans of India, particularly the Nizam of Hyderabad, to aid Britain. This was very effective. Russia and Persia could not extend any aid to India because they were afraid of Turkey, supported by the European concert of Britain, France, Italy and other nations.

In this connection it may be mentioned that during the European War the Indian revolutionists did their best to establish foreign relations with various states of the world, as Benjamin Franklin and others tried to do on behalf of revolutionary America on the eve of the establishment of the United States of America. These very activities of the Indian revolutionists were probably the most important causes for Mr. Montagu's sanctioning so-called reforms. Lord Morley started his scheme of rallying the moderates by the Morley-Minto reform plan after the Indian revolutionary movement took a terroristic turn.

Today the majority of Indian nationalists under the unique leadership of Mahatma M.K. Gandhi are advocating non-violent Non-cooperation to achieve Swaraj or Self Rule. To-day there is no Germany challenging British world-supremacy, neither France, Russia, nor any other power is in a position to attack India successfully and Japan is Britain's ally in the Orient, yet Britain is piling up military expenditure in India, as General Rawlinson, the Commander-in-Chief of British forces plainly says, to avert a

general national uprising. Thus India is facing the struggle against British militarism.

To-day there are about 30,000 political prisoners in India, under the administration of Lord Reading, who altho a Jew, is carrying out the British Imperialistic policy with greater sternness than any other British administrator. Britain is using Jews to govern the Orient and Readings, Montagues, Samuels are the leading lights of Zionism. India must crush Britain's militarism, if she wishes to be free and independent. It is a matter of time when the whole world will wake up to the menace of British militarism and India should take the lead to rouse international conscience.

Britain's militarism, navalism, and her determination to dominate the world depend upon her ability to utilize other powers to further her interest. This is British diplomacy. British diplomacy is at the zenith of its success. Today America, Japan and all Europe is aiding British militarism positively and by indirect means under the guise of serving their own interest and preserving world peace. America is practically bound to a pro-British policy leading to Anglo-

American alliance or Understanding. So far as the Pacific is concerned Japan and France are bound to support Britain by the so-called Four Power Pact. Germany and Italy are playing in the hands of Britain because of the fear of French Imperialism. Russia is catering to British diplomacy to bring France to terms in spite of much talk of radicalism of Soviet diplomacy, the real nature of it is nothing more than taking dictation from Lloyd George against France. Britain thus has not only made the Baltic a British lake but she has made the Mediterranean a British lake. There is a good prospect for an Anglo-German-Russian-Japanese-American understanding to crown the success of British diplomacy and to strengthen British world domination through her navalism, militarism and Air Forces. This is the real world menace which is facing the world particularly Asia and India. This is the real nature of British peril which India will have to fight unless something happens to defeat British diplomacy.

Europe of to-day is more or less a vassal to Britain and she will remain so until the continental European statesmen pay heed to the sound

policy once outlined by the great Russian statesman, Count Witte, to the effect that friendly understanding must be brought about between France and Germany through the good offices of Russia which must not be a tool of Britain. Then there will arise a continental block of Russia, Germany, and France which will draw Italy and Spain in it for no other purpose but to check the British policy of keeping continental Europe divided to further Britain's imperial designs. This will bring peace to Europe and this will force Japan to give up her relations with Britain and America will not favor Anglo-American Alliance against the whole world to uphold British Imperialism in Europe, Asia, Africa. The Indian statesmen conscious of the ultimate fight between British militarism and navalism and the rising democracy in India should absorb themselves to bring about active co-operation with those European statesmen who are not anxious to subscribe to the ideal of world peace under British Domination.

CHAPTER X

RECENT ASPECTS OF BRITAIN'S INDIAN POLICY.

The British Policy of the retention of India and British possession of all approaches to India is written into the Treaty of Peace with Germany, at the conclusion of the World War. For the security of India she made a protectorate of Egypt, secured mandates in Palestine, Arabia and Mesopotamia and created the state of the Hedjaz.

During the Anglo-French controversy which arose out of circumstances attendant to the Washington Conference, Earl Curzon stated that Britain must not allow any nation to be supreme in the Middle East, and thus jeopardize the control of the route to India.

The Washington Conference was likewise influenced by considerations arising out of Britain's interest in India. Britain desired the support of the United States and Japan and, if possible of France in supporting her Asian Empire. On the other hand, she would have

been apprehensive of an alliance between France and Japan, because such a combination linked up with the nationalist movement in India would create very serious difficulties for Britain. The Four-Power pact safeguards the British position in the Orient no less satisfactorily than did the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which it supersedes. Mr. Sastri, a servant of the British government, representing the British in India was brought to Washington, as a symbol of Indian participation in the Conference in an official manner.

The Anglo-French ill-feeling at the Washington Conference was due in part to Britain's firm stand against France's Oriental policy, which is very prejudicial to British interests. France supported the Kemalist government against Greece, the tool of Britain. Britain wants to weaken Turkey, whereas France is in favor of maintaining Turkey in Asia Minor so that the British influence will not be paramount in that section of the country. Britain desires no nation challenging her position between the Suez Canal and India.

Anglo-French relations became strained when France demanded a navy equal to that

of Japan. In a secret session Mr. Balfour opposed France's demand and spoke in unmistakable terms. He pointed out that if France wished to have a navy equal to that of Japan, and Italy insisted on having a navy equal to that of France, Great Britain would support Italy. In that case the combined naval forces of France and Italy would be superior to those of Great Britain in the Mediterranean, and thus endanger Britain's control of the sea route to India via the Suez Canal. Britain's opposition to a large submarine tonnage was dictated in part by the apprehension of the damage that this type of vessel could inflict, endangering the route to India.

It was for the sake of Indian security that Britain made a compromise with Ireland. It is because of India that Britain has given so much consideration to Egypt. It is the question of imperial interests in India that caused Britain to strive for an understanding with Afghanistan. It is because of India that Britain shows an apparently conciliatory spirit towards the Arabs, and at the same time, establishing military air routes from Alexandria to Karachi. It is to

strengthen her position in India that Britain has taken Tibet within her fold and is continually encroaching in Southern China and the Malayan Peninsula, by building impregnable naval bases, particularly at Singapore.

Before making a trade agreement with Soviet Russia, Britain extracted a promise from Russia, that there would be no Russian menace direct, or indirect to India. Britain demanded that Russia must not distribute propaganda material in India, as one of the conditions of British recognition of Soviet Russia at the Genoa conference. It is with India in mind that Britain is talking of certain revisions in the Treaty of Sevres, on the theory that the Bosphorus will remain in her control, and that there be no Russian menace through a Russo-Turkish or Russo-Turkish-French understanding. The recent treaty of Rappollo was most disquieting for it brings to the stage of world politics a potential land force, the greatest of modern history to oppose Britain's sea power. The drama may be fought out in Central Asia.

The Nations of the world who have relations with Britain's world policies are watching

India's march towards her absolute independence, for a free India would mean, not only a change in the map of Asia, but a change in the political map of Europe.

While Indian statesmen continue to think and work in terms of India within the Empire of Great Britain, independent nations are not interested in aiding India to achieve the status of a dominion. No nation which fears British world-supremacy would care to aid any movement in India which is directed towards strengthening the British imperial system, through the establishment of a self-governing dominion in India.


Free from British control, India would have remarkable possibilities of economic development. In discussing the coal and iron situation in the world, Mr. Ellis Barker states that India has more iron resources than China and it may be that they may be equal to all that of other countries of Asia. It is needless to emphasize that an India with coal resources of no less than 79,001,000,000 tons and with actual reserves of iron amounting to 65,000,000 tons and potential reserves of 250,000,000 tons


as estimated by Mr. Barker, is of great interest to industrial countries. A free India would mean commercial possibilities in a land which is now practically controlled by a British monopoly.

The nations which would be interested in the Indian Independence movement are those which are in close competition with Britain in world politics and commerce. At present, the United States, Japan and France are in a position to have an independent foreign policy if they choose, without fearing very much from Great Britain. It is the policy of Britain to be tied up with these powers so that they will not develop an independent foreign policy which might threaten her interests. Next come Italy, Germany and Russia. Britain courts them in such a way that they will probably remain subservient to her policies for some time. This being the case Indian statesmen who realize the Indian position in world politics should endeavour to establish independent foreign relations with these powers. The political pendulum of international politics is always on the swing, and there is no doubt that there will

be constant change of policy among nations. Indian statesmen should be active in establishing understandings with those powers whose interests it will be to aid India in her independence movement. Britain holds India through India's isolation in world politics. No Indian statesmen with a conscience, can ignore that India has been the means of enslavement of various nations in Asia and Africa. India will have to take a stand so that through her efforts and the new orientation of world politics these nations will be freed.

Political independence of India will mean something hollow if it does not breathe of the idealism of Rajdharma,—(ruling based upon the creed of righteousness). Peace on earth and good will to men should be the guiding principle of Indian statesmanship, and with that idealism they should take a stand in world politics. A Republic in India will take its stand on the rock of peace and justice and liberty to all peoples, so that all nations will be free to work out their destinies without interference from outside. May a Republic in India be a factor in bringing about world peace !








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